This article is a philosophical critique of a ve ry controve rsial paradigm within Africana Studies. The methodology employed in this paper is a philosophical critique of the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of Afrocentricity. The quest fo r a distinctive (metaphysical) Africanist perspective has cast Afrocentricity as a subjectivist approach to affirming the in tegrity of an Africana existential condition. While in the course of African American intellectual history a number of sc holars and thinkers have supported the notion of an unique Black metaphysics, Afrocentricity brings to the table a particular ap proach to the tradition of affirming an African metaphysical exclusivism. What I mean by the quest for particularity is the notion that there is a unique Africana presence in the wo rld, such that it stands antithetical to the EuropeanlWestern ex perience. I explore what I call "weak Afrocentricity," i.e., a cul tural determinism demarcating the African and European ex perience. Afrocentricity, in positing a cultural relativism, ren ders that not only is Eurocentrism a false universality. but that universality per se is false. This denial of universality (at the ontological level) has as a corresponding category the nega tion of objectivity (at the epistemological plane). I examine the works of two leading Afrocentric proponents, Molefi Asante and Marimba Ani, arguably two of the most significant con tributors to the philosophical fo undations of Afrocentricity.
All attempts, all quests to affirm the human existence of Af rican Americans vis-a-vis the claims of racism and national chauvinism ulti mately center on the question, what counts as belonging to the wo rld? The nationalist response (of which Afrocentricity is a species) brings the question of belonging to the world to the forefront. American nationalism is discarded and in its place some fo rm of African nationalism becomes preeminent. Malcolm X's statement, "We are not American but victims of Americanism" graphically gives expression to the nationalist rejection of Euro-American national chauvinism. His privileging of human over civil rights has a crucial cultural counterpart, the legitimatization of an African American cultural heritage as an autonomous tradition. Fo r the Afrocentrists, what counts as belonging to the wo rld is the existential affirmation of an Africanity which entails determinate ontological, epis temological, and axiological implications. This quest is one which has its grounding in a national rather than a liberal democratic paradigm. In terms of intellectual culture, the Afrocentric intellectual imperative moves beyond inclusion in America to what can be best described as a critique and corrective of the traditional academic canon. This critique and cor rective are the first steps toward the affirmation of African particularity. Fo r the so-called integrationist (read assimilationists), this central ques tion remains in a mediated fo rm. What counts as belonging to the world finds immediate expression in provincial terms, entailed in the more pa rochial question, what counts as belonging to America? Hence the st ruggle for civil rights and inclusion into the mainstream of American life, including the canon(s) of intel lectual culture, are viewed as a neces sary and sufficient condition for the quest of belonging in the world.
The integrationist is fueled by a firm belief and conviction that this country is in an essential way a good, if not the greatest, place for one to live. America's prime failure, its greatest blemish, for the integrationist, is its racism. The integrationist maxim is simply-eliminate racism and true democracy will surely flourish. The integrationist fully embraces the lib eral democratic paradigm. Nevertheless, the problem faced by the inte grationist is the fai lure of liberal democracy to embrace Black people as Americans. Langston Hughes' poem, "I To o Sing America," is a stirring expression of the integrationist protest against such rejection. In terms of intellectual culture, i.e., the Euro-American academy, the imperative is inclusionary, the push for more Black faces in the academy and in textbooks, e.g., affirmative action and multicultural education.
The Afrocentric critique and corrective call into question the academy's canon, i.e. , the prescribed corpus of literature which func tions as the academy's foundational elements. The Afrocentric project is engaged in a cultural war over the anchor of attendant assumptions and presuppositions undergirding the academy. Hence, the mere act of inclusion, of making provision fo r courses on the Africana experience, fa lls drastically short of the Afrocentrist's aim of reconstituting the very basis of what has functioned as the higher learning. Ergo, Afrocentricity is not merely an academic addendum, better yet, it calls fo r a reconfiguration of the whole, traditional, academic enterprise. Afrocentricity boldly shifts the discourse on Africana Studies from the margins to the mainstream of academic and intellectual life. This paper is a philosophical critique of Afrocentricity. What I mean by the quest for particularity comprises more than the explication of par ticularity via a descriptive presentation of the uniqueness of the Africana (here Africana is inclusive of the diasporian experience) locus in the world but, as well, entails a critical discourse on discursive practices relating to Black Studies, i.e., Africana, African, or African American Stud ies. What is pivotal to this discourse is the repudiation of all scholarship on the Black experience which relegates and restrains this experience to the level of an object of investigation. The Afrocentric project seeks to counter such objectification by proffering distinctive discursive practices which go beyond the pale of the traditional disciplines in the academy. The determination of such discursive practices, theories, and method ologies, the Afrocentrists posit, in the final analysis, (if not immediately) derives from the African experience. Hence Black Studies, Afrocentrists claim, is a disciplinary focus and is parasitic upon an Afrocentric para digm.
Several central points are contained in my notion of a philosophical critique of the Afrocentric project. First, this critique is from a definitive philosophical perspective , viz., dialectical materialism.
Second, the Af rocentric project contains a plurality of intellectual threads, which fo rm a fabric of thought, which at best can be described as a mosaic, i.e. , individual threads which maintain distinguishable quali ties regarding analytical premises, emphasis, scope, and direction, yet all are woven together, and a common ontological, epistemological, and axiological fabric, i.e., a worldview or weltanschauung. My critique fo cuses on a composite sketch of the mosaic rather than a detailed exami nation of the various threads and strands, though I give particular atten tion to Molefi Asante's contributions due to his prominence as the intel lectual systematize r of Afrocentricity, along with Marimba Ani's recent magnum opus, Yu rugu. Arguably, their works constitute a formidable philosophical bedrock for the Afrocentric project.
Third, given the mosaic character of the Afrocentric project, I distin guish between a weak and a strong Afrocentricity. This line of demarca tion emanates from what I view as a metaphysical exclusivism whose focus is the bifurcation of historical and cultural reality into a mutually exclusive relationship between the African and European cultural ma trix. This juxtaposition, when expressed in strong Afrocentricity, finds its catalyst in either an environmental determinism, e.g., the thesis of sun versus ice people or a biogenetic causal theory where melanin (or better yet the lack of it) is said to have generated social, cultural, and psycho- McClendon -Th e Afr ocentric Project course is an intellectual imperative which derives from the effort to erect a philosophical foundation for the Afrocentric project. So despite his seem ingly centrist perspective and commitment to cultural relativism, Asante enters the waters of European discourse and discursive practice. His entrance is ostensibly to describe, for us, the Eurocentric tradition. Asante's discussion and interpretation of the polemic between positiv ism and critical theory has import because he argues his Afrocentric critique and (European) critical theory "are engaged in a somewhat similar enterprise in reorienting thinking."3 Ye t he tenders this caveat: Despite critical theory assaults on the pitfalls of positivism, this polemic is an "Eurocentric family debate over the nature of ideology."4 So the similar ity between Afrocentrism and critical theory is only a surface appear ance that when explicated (deconstructed) renders demarcated cul tural ontologies undergoing quite different intellectual enterprises.
Granted, this debate originates within the European intellectual tra dition (as does the Marxist/Freudian polemic which Asante also com ments on); nevertheless I am compelled to bring into bold relief the glar ing fact, that today these polemics are not constrained by its European origins. Indeed, the above polemics are presently waged on an interna tional (global) plane outside of the EuropeanlWestern cultural terrain. So the fact remains that the genesis of aforesaid polemics does not, in any way, confine their epistemological validity and ve racity narrowly to European (Western) concerns. Asante charges critical theorists with ar rogance due to their ignorance or lack of appreciation of the African conception of the unity of reality. Even if we assume the veracity of this claim, the question before us is how does a failure to appreciate the African conception of the unity of reality become equivalent to arrogance and thus Eurocentrism? The Afrocentric critique of Eurocentrism here involves a conflation of categories where, by virtue of their European origin, all such categories must be seen as Eurocentrist. Just as Asante argues elsewhere to be African is not necessarily to be Afrocentric, would not this hold true fo r Europeans and Eurocentrism? 5 What then is Eurocentrism? How may we discern the difference between what is sim ply European from Eurocentrism? Is one's engagement in the European intellectual tradition a sufficient condition fo r making the charge of Eurocentrism? In Molefi's analysis, there is no exemplar of a differentia specifica which we may employ to discriminate between the two. So the critical theory/positivist and the Marxist/Freudian debates are described within the Eurocentric tradition because of the simple identity (conflation) of the categories European and Eurocentrist. For Asante, the critique of Eurocentrism is not a process whereby what is European is differenti ated from Eurocentrism. Asante tells us, "[t]he invalidity of an idea arises, not from its exponents, but from its own fundamental flaws." 6 I strongly agree with this assertion, however, and unfortunately, Asante fa ils to follow his own assertion and instead fa lls into the trap of the genetic Explorations in Ethnic Studies Vol. 18, No. 1 fallacy. A genetic fallacy is one whereby the genesis of an idea becomes the basis for its invalid ity. In this case, the European origin of ideas is a sufficient condition to claim Eurocentrism. Here it is important to note this same line of reasoning continues with his rejection of Marxism. He argues, "[b] ut because it [Marxism] emerged from the western conscious ness, Marxism is mechanical in its approach to social understanding and development. .. " 7 The assumption not only entails that Marxism is mechanical (despite Marxist dialectics), but it includes the ludicrous pre supposition that Western consciousness per se is intrinsically mechani cal. Asante's essentialist method in describing and analyzing both Euro pean and African thought is what is most mechanical here. He ignores the long history of intellectual exchange and specifically philosophical discourse in Europe where there were/are many proponents of a dy namic, dialectical approach to nature, society, and thought itself. Marx ism was/is a prominent voice in the Western philosophical tradition of dialectical thinking starting from Heraclitus on up to Hegel and even encompassing a number of the critical theorists a la the Frankfurt School, a po int which was well understood by a wide spectrum of Black philoso phers including: William Ferris, George G. M. James, C. L. R. James, Martin Luther King Jr., Charles Leander Hill, Kwame Nkrumah, and Sekou To ure. Consequently, Asante's assertion regarding Western thought as endemically mechanistic manifests both an ignorance of European and Africana intel lectual history. A poor commentary fo r a thinker who seeks to establish a philosophical grounding and a paradigmatic foundation fo r Africana Studies.
Asante's essentialism does an additional disservice to African reali ties. An essentialist view of Africa effectively arrests the dialectical con stitution and composition of an African heritage and cultural trad itions. Rather than his monolithic paradigm (i.e., the African conception of unity, reality, va lues etc.), we have the dialectical interconnection of unity and diversity (the unity of opposites), which brings into focus both the iden tity and difference which has characterized the African experience from the days of Kemet to the present. I want to propose a different method for determining not only what is meant by Eurocentrism, but also suggest a way to disclose all forms of centrism. By doing so, it becomes possible to show how one may sub ject centrism to a critique of its fundamental flaws. My claim is that eth nocentrism is flawed because it centers reality around a given ethnic group. Such centering, by inference, devalues all other groups by virtue of their not being members of the central group. Eurocentrism is a spe cies of ethnocentrism. Here the center becomes Europe (the West) and thus all groups outside of the European (Western) experience are infer entially devalued. My critique is aimed not at Europe, as the point of origin, but at the centrist perspective which relegates all others to a lesser status and place in the world. The danger in Eurocentrism is precisely its
McClelldoll -Th e Afrocelltric Project centrist casting. Europe per 5e (as a category) is value neutral. By that I mean socio-cultural phenomena emanating out of Europe, by virtue of their genesis, are neither endemically nor intrinsically good or bad, pro gressive or reactionary, beautiful or ugly. Following this line of reason ing, Afrocentrism, via its commitment to a centrist paradigm, is a spe cies of ethnocentrism and is subject to the same fundamental flaws of Eurocentrism, viz. , devaluing that which is not African. The emergence of fa lse universality (what the Afrocentric project aims to critique and correct) logically follows from the centering of a given group. The privi leging (centering) of a give n group presupposes all other groups are at best satellites in a cultural orbit around the central group. However, if it is argued that each group by virtue of its own cultural matrix has epistemo logical validity, as long as it remains within its domain, what results is an ontological formulation whereby reality is seen as a monadology without a Leibnizian pre-established harmony. This scheme of a universe of centers (centrisms) where autonomy (objectivity) is granted only within the limits of a given cultural matrix is a relativism which directs us into the swamp of subjectivism. The method ological implications for Afrocentrism, tout court, is a stringent subjectiv ism. Asante argues, " I do not castigate any other method, for all meth ods are valid within their context. "8 This context, for Asante, is a cultural one specifically situating Africa (and Europe) as a cultural whole and, thus, his proposal for centering within an Af rican cultural matrix. The nagging problem for all relativists, and specifically Asante's Afrocentrism, is the paradox of incommensurability. In the case of Afrocentrism, the paradox of the incommensurability is exemplified in the relationship be tween the cultural heritage of Africa and Europe. If one claims what is true for Europe may be false for Africa and vice versa, then on what basis can we determine truth or falSity? We are confronted with this ques tion since our culture-boundedness constricts us epistemologically, ontologically, and axiologically.
Part of the ambiguity in Asante's undertaking is that he offers opin ions on such "Western" intellectual issues and philosophical problems as the mind/body problem and idealism/materialism debate, and prof fers philosophical judgment on such figures as Protagoras, Aristotle, Sartre, Hegel, Marx, Kuhn, and Feyerbend, among others. Ye t his notion of a cultural bound centrism and cultural relativism, in fact, nullifies any opinion, view, or perspective he may have concerning those persons and issues outside of the African world. In terms of his own cultural relativism, it is axiomatic that if one ventures out of his/her cultural cen ter to participate in any other then that constitutes broaching fa lse uni versality. It is to take what is an African ideal and apply it to an European reality. The right to speak (or rather rightly speaking) requires residence in a given cultural context. As such, this manifestation of the paradox of incommensurality or relativism simply means there is no way one can assert the truth or falsity, the good or bad, the beauty or ugliness of any proposition or thing beyond one's cultural boundaries because there is no common domain or intersecting terrain. Cultural matrix conceived as autonomous centers, islands in themselves, or monads in self-contain ment, can offer no basis fo r objective truth or falsity beyond the bounds of a particular culture. Essentially, what is true or false is rel ative to par ticularity.
The irony of it all is that the very critique of false universality is un dermined because if false universality is a value of Eurocentrism then it may not be false from the standpoint of Eurocentrism. Relative to Eurocentrism, it is a true universality. Correspondingly, it may be relative to Afrocentricity, viewed as a false universality. There is no objective grounds to claim false universality, only relative ground which makes it an either/or proposition. Either its true or fa lse depending on one's cul tural reference point.
Asante posits the "problem is not in the expounding of Western cat egories but in the absolute manner in which they are assumed to consti tute the whole of human thought"(false universality) . 9 He is at this point differentiating what is European (Western) from Eurocentrism, which is something he had fail to do throughout his earlier discussion. This refer ence to absolutism is none other than the claim that false universality is Eurocentrism. Now, it is not European categories which are the threat, but absolutism as false universality, hence the danger of centrism in Eurocentrism. The solution to this problem cannot have as its foundation an ontology which, in turn, gives affirmation to a plurality of particulari ties which have no objective support beyond their limited individual spheres. The critique of absolutism, or false universality, by Afrocentricity is undermined by the ve ry act of its negating the category of objectivity. All particularities, enshrined in a centrist shell, will find their quest unful filled by negating the very basis which makes true particularity a reality. The truth of particularity resides in its dialectical relationship to univer sality. The universal as true universality, ove r and against false univer sality, must of logical necessity take into account what it is that makes for the commensurability of differing cultural or social formations. In effect, what does it mean to be human? What is the common denominator or connecting thread linking the wo rld's diverse communities? The need for a category signifying commensurability among different cultural ma trixes axiomaticly req uires a notion of universality and objectivity.
Though Asante may be considered the leading theorist of the Afrocentrist proj ect, the recent contribution of Marimba Ani to the corpus of Afrocentric theoretical fo rmulations is arguably the most substantive wo rk in the critique of Eurocentrism. Her Yu rugu is both an intensive and extensive re ndering of ove r six hundred pages. Time and space does not allow a detailed examination at this juncture; however, I will address her central thesis by way of summation.1 0
We found that Asante, despite his conflation of the categories Euro pean and Eurocentrism, concluded that a line of demarcation was nec essary for the real danger consisted in the absolutizing of European categories as universals. Ani, on the other hand, argues that European cultural thought and behavior is intrinsically absolutist. European thought, for Ani, is Eurocentric.
Yu rugu as a moment in the movement is, no doubt, an apogee in the chorus of voices comprising Afrocentric discursive practices. And though her vo ice reaches the upper scale and contributes some unique improvisa tional polish to the Afrocentric ensemble, she is not a mere soloist without accompanying voices. Therefore, it is crucial, in my estimation, to contexualize Yu rugu as an Afrocentric text. The locus of Yu rugu, within the ty pology of strong and weak Afrocentricity, is as a weak Afrocentric text since the overriding principle employed, by Ani, for demarcating the African from the European paradigm is culturally determined. Ani, as an Afrocentric proponent, views the articulation of the African-cente red perspective, as a dialectical process, whereby, the ne gation of European thought is the necessary ground for affirming African thought. She states, "[t]o be truly liber ated, African people must come to know the nature of European thought and behavior in order to understand the effect that Europe has had on our ability to think victoriously. We must be able to separate our thought from European thought, so as to visualize a future that is not dominated by Europe." 11 For Ani, this dialectical process is, on the one hand, "intellectual decolonization", and, on the other, "cultural regeneration." The first pole, "intellectual decolonization" is the explicit critique of Europe, while the second pole, "cultural regeneration", is implicitly contained in the first. Hence, the departure, the rupture from European epistemological pre suppositions is a logical priority for the affirmative articulation of an Afri can-centered worldview. With regard to positing a critique of the Euro pean cultural matrix, Ani shares a common intellectual space with Chinweizu, Iva Carruthers, George G. M. James, Diop, Olela, and Bernal among others. However, in important respects she takes a fundamen tally diffe rent twist from James, Diop, Ole la, and Bernal in how she situ ates Western (European) thought generally, and philosophy particularly. When we contextualize Yu rugu within the terrain of Afrocentric critiques of European philosophy, Ani parts company in an essential way from this tradition. Her departure rests on the foundational assumption that
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Greek philosophy, and specifically Platonic philosophy, is the seminal germ for European imperialism. Whereas Diop, Olela, James, and Bernal all claim that Greek philosophy, and specifically Platonism, is grounded in, if not a wholesale plagiarism of, African philosophical thought. 12 My critique is in substance a philosophical one. The constraints of time will limit my discussion to the following points:
What is the locus of Platonism in the history of world philosophy? Can it be reasonably demonstrated that Platonism is (or in some sense is) a prototype of Western philosophy?
2.
My second point addresses an epistemological problematic. Here my concern centers on the subject/object dialectic wherein Plato nic thought demarcates these two categories and argues for the objectifica tion of knowledge. For Plato, this objectification signals the emergence of philosophy as a science of knowledge ("episteme") which stands over and against mythology's merger and subsequent identity of subject and object. Ani upholds the identify of these categories and claims objectiv ity is mystification. The question before us is, can one reasonably claim that the realist elements in Plato's epistemology constitute a mystical casting of knowledge?
Albeit my critique, prima fa cie, may appear to be a modest under taking since so much more can be said about a text which is over six hundred pages, I think I can demonstrate there is a sufficient warrant to my critique. My focus is on the philosophical anchors which ground her intellectual undertaking --philosophical anchors at the level of history of philosophy and epistemology.
Platonism and the History of Western Philosophy
The question before us is, what is the locus of Platonism in the his tory of philosophy. For Ani, Plato (though influenced by what she terms "pre-Socratic Af rican philosophies") seems to have gone beyond this influence and was the catalyst for a distinctive philosophical stance. She argues, "[w]hat Plato seems to have done is to have laid a rigor ously constructed foundation fo r the repudiation of the symbolic sense-the denial of cosmic, intuitive knowledge. It is this process that we need to trace, this develop ment in fo rmative European thought which was eventu ally to have such a devastating effect on the nontechni cal aspects of the culture. It led to the material;za tion( J. H. Mc) of the universe as conceived by the European mind--a materialization that complemented and supported the intense psycho-cultural need fo r control of self and others. 1 3 While Ani does not deny African influences on Plato (though she does not state precisely what these influences were), she strongly as serts that Plato was the initial and key European thinker to bring about a paradigmatic shift from an intuitionist to a materialist view of the uni verse. For Ani, this shift from intuitionism to materialism is not confined to Plato's persona as it becomes the essential feature of European thought. Ani's summation of Plato entails three crucial elements we need to investigate. First, Plato was influe nced by African philosophical cur rents. While she gives no direct evidence in the text of such influences, she does provide references in her first endnote.
The first endnote contains a refe rence to the Platonic dialogue the Timaeus. There is no annotation as to why she makes this reference. One who is modestly educated in Platonic philosophy can infe r the ref erence is made since this dialogue not only makes reference to Egypt, but follows the Egyptian doctrine of the uncreatability of matter. Both James and Obenga, who are also referenced in this endnote, make ex plicit mention to Egyptian doctrine in their works. 1 4 What is critical to our discussion is that both Obenga and James (even more vigorously than Obenga) assert an Egyptian influence on Plato.
Second, neither they nor Olela argue that there is an epistemologi cal break dividing Egyptian and Platonic thought, instead they stringently assert a continuity with Egyptian thought. Both James and Olela argue this continuity is based on plagiarism. Now, of course, the fai lure to observe such an epistemological break in no way makes Ani's claim invalid. But even if we take as a given that they miss the boat and fail to recognize the Platonic epistemological reputure, Ani's further claim that Platonism is materialist does not hold.
While Platonic epistemology is, in fact, a realist view, it is not mate rialism. Platonic realism is realist because it is an objective idealist stance parasitic upon a rationalist presupposition that mind is not restricted to individual instantiations. Mind for Plato, as with all objective idealists, is a general independent category and not circumscribed by an individual, existential, character.
What Plato calls for in his epistemology is a shift from perceptual to rational cognition. This fact does not imply intuition is absent from Platonic epistemology, for intuition plays a crucial role in his notion of anamnesis or recollection, as we witness in the Meno. Hence, Plato's rationalism in cludes intuition rather than excludes it. Reason has logical priority ove r intuition, but reason does not negate intuition's presence. In fact, Platonism needs intuition as a crucial component for recollection.
In the history of philosophy, the resort to anamnesis or recollection is predicated on the notion of innate ideas. Rationalists, since they de value the ro le of experience, are intrinsically bound to resort to some notion of innate ideas, since ideas for rationalists are not derived from experiential encounters, as witness in Cartesian rationalism.
Third, Platonism, in the history of philosophy, is not a shift to materi alism but idealism. It was precisely the pre-Socratic Ionian thinkers who began the march toward materialist philosophy. Thales, often referred to as the first Greek philosopher if not the first philosopher, studied in Egypt and ca'me back a materialist. His materialism, as James and Olela show, is consistent with Egyptian philosophy. The argument that materialism is a European philosophy, and thus alien to Africa, is not supported by historical evidence. Plato was not a materialist nor is materialism uniquely a European philosophy. 1 5 Plato's idealism is in part a response to Heraclitian materialism. The other part of the equation in this response is Parmenides' idealism. What Plato seeks at the epistemological and ontological plane is a critical syn thesis of Heraclitus' dialectics and Parmenides' absolute idealism. The critical philosophical question, for Plato, is the reconciliation of the cat egories of permanence (Parmenides) and change (Heraclitus).
Why has Ani missed the boat regarding Plato's place in the history of philosoP�lY? I think her failure to grasp Platonism in the history of philosophy is due to her methodology. Her method is anthropological not philosophical. Anthropological or sociological reductionism cannot describe or explain philosophical discourse. Her attempts to break from Platonic epistemological restraints requires an epistemological, not an anthropological, analysis. While Plato's philosophical discourse takes place in a social, political, and culture context, and understanding that context is very important, it cannot, however, be a substitute for a con crete philosophical analysis of concrete philosophical problems. To con fuse idealism with materialism is an error due to her fundamental igno rance of philosophy. One reason James, Olela, and Obenga do not make the same error is because they understand philosophy and recognize the differentia specifica which demarcates philosophy from anthropol ogy. While anthropology and philosophy are not antithetical categories, and indeed work together philosophical anthropology they cannot be conflated. The context of a philosophical doctrine while dialectically re lated to the content of philosophical discourse cannot be reduced to it.
Plato's idealism was a philosophical response to a concrete con stellation of philosophical issues which were intrinsically connected with a host of socio-political problems prevailing in Athens. Plato's attempt at resolving the philosophical antithesis between Heraclitus' dialectical materialism and Parmenides' absolute idealism in its political ramifica tion sought the restoration of an aristocratic landowning ruling class. Thus, any concrete analysis of the specificity of Greek philosophy, any
McClendoll -Th e Afrocentric Project disclosure of Greek philosophy's diffe rentia specifica demarcating it from any other cultural matrix, i.e., an African philosophy cannot be uncov ered by Ani's essentialist anthropological methodology. One cannot ex plain the historical and glaring empirical fact the pre-Socratic philoso phy, as opposed to mythology, was materialist.
Ani's thesis that Europe is a cultural entity accents its cohesiveness, integration (integral unity), and common features. But she does this by a reductionism which asserts, "[b]eneath its deceptive heterogeneity lies a monolithic essence; an essence that accounts for the success of Eu ropean imperialism." 16 The heterogeneity of Greek philosophy, for example, is not a deception; if is a historical and an empirical fact. The concrete explanation of this fact requires a method and theory which guides us toward an expla nation of what is given and not a simplistic dismissal of the facts. A theory or philosophy of liberation cannot afford to say, "My mind is made up. Don't confuse me with facts. " The heterogeneity of Greek philosophy is a fact. How do we, in seeking to understand this fact, explain it?
In part, Ani's confusion is the result conflating Plato's importance and influence in Western philosophy with trying to demonstrate that Platonism is a prototype of European philosophy. The affi rmation of the fo rmer does not logically lead to the latter. Important and influential philo sophical doctrines are not necessarily prototypes for subsequent doc trines, but instead can serve to create differing responses within philo sophical traditions. Aldred North Whitehead's statement, "Western phi losophy is a series of footnotes to Plato," was not a claim that Platonism is a prototype in Western philosophy (he understood well how Aristotle, for example, sought to dismantle Platonic fo rms from arid abstractions to a concrete category). Better yet, Platonism was a significant view to which Western philosophers in its wake, in due course, had to respond. However, could not the same be said of Hegel fo r the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? Are not Marxist dialectical materialism, Russel's logical atomism, and James' and Dewey's pragmatism, in some way, all responses (footnotes) to Hegel? Surely no one literate in philosophy would claim that Hegelianism is the Western prototype fo r the nineteenth and twentieth century? Platonism importance and influence cannot be reduced to a prototype.
I want to conclude this discussion on Platonism locus in the history of philosophy by returning to the issue of why Ani, in her critique of Plato (and Western philosophy) , departs from her Afrocentric fo rerunners in the persona of James, Diop, Olela, and Bernal. What the latter group did was to point to the continuity of philosophical doctrines; a continuity of philosophical doctrines, in which differences regarding social, political, and cultural context could not override. Plato found in Egyptian philoso phy and the State a model to carry out his reactionary aims. This conti nuity in philosophical doctrines refutes the basic assumption of Ani that Explorations in Ethnic Studies Vol. 18, No. 1 there is a fundamental metaphysical exclusivism between the European and African cultural matrix.
On the other hand, there were differences in the context in which Plato did philosophy and the African experience which influenced his thought. The latter group"s, James, Olela, andDiop, blunder was in not demarcating the concrete context. The salient continuity of philosophi cal doctrines obscured, for them, the differentia specifica of context in which philosophical discourse took place. Ani recognizes that there are differences, but she locates this difference in both context and philo sophical doctrine by virtue of her metaphysical exclusion of Europe from Africa. What both Ani and her forerunners share in common is the failure to take into account the dialectical interplay of context and doctrine. Con sequently, the locus of Platonism in the history of philosophy objectively remains undisclosed for them.
There is an additional point which entails an ontological problem atic, viz. , the categorical relationship of particularity to universality. While it can be argued that the categories (unive rsality and particularity) should not be conflated, conversely, they ought not be separated, for particular ity and universality are correlative categories. By correlative categories I mean that each depends upon the other to exist. Particularity is not then a solitary category as assumed by the Afrocentrist.
The Epistemological Problematic:
Subject/Object Dialectic Ani's claims that Plato, by virtue of differentiating between subject (knower) and object (the known) and arguing for the objectification of knowledge, formulates a "new epistemology" where objects replace sym bols. She asserts, "[i]n the previous and disparate world-views, we see a knowing subject intimately involved in the surrounding universe. The acquisition of knowledge involving an immersion in this universe until, through sympathetic participation, meaning is revealed, expressed and understood via complex and multidimensional symbols. "17 While it is true Plato's aim is the objectification of knowledge, it is not the case that this in and of itself constitutes a new epistemology. Ani, following Eric Havelock, establishes her notion of a new epistemology by contrasting Plato's philosophy to the Homeric poetic era. The con trast of Platonic philosophy to Homeric poetics is, in fact, a contrast be tween distinct kinds of intellectual discourse, i.e., between philosophy and mythology rather than disparate philosophical schools. The mytho logical use of symbols is consistent with the artistic form (poetry) of ex pression. Poetry seeks not the cognition of reality, but better yet, it is an avenue for the affective expression (an emotional response and release) of and to reality. Affective expression is laden with symbols, e.g., meta phor, simile, analogy, and synaesthesia; however, philosophy and par-
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ticularly Platonism is not void of symbolism. Indeed, Ani makes refer ence herself to Plato's use of allegory, in the allegory of the cave. 18 The grounds fo r charge of reification rest in the problem of the ob jectification of knowledge. Earlier I said the objectification of knowledge did not constitute a new epistemology by Plato. The break by philosophy from mythology, a break which precedes Plato required the objectifica tion of knowledge. Rather than the mythological notion of the identity of subject and object which is an identity of immediacy, philosophy renders any identity of subject and object as a mediation. Western thought has numerous examples of the identity of subject and object, from Berkley to Hegel, yet fo r all objective idealists it is a process of mediation.
The mediation of subject and object is a logical necessity fo r any and all cognitive, as opposed to affective, undertaking. Even Ani follows this logical necessity when she argues that we must move from "decep tive heterogenity" to "monolithic essence." Here she is calling for a cog nitive process whereby appearance (heterogeneity) and essence are not only not an immediate identity, but that our perceptions of the imme diate appearance are different from the objective reality of monolithic essence. If the subject's immediate apprehension of essence can be false, then it follows essence stands apart, objectively separate, from the knower as subject.
The movement from appearance to essence is an implicit recogni tion that the identity of subject and object is not immediate, thus in some sense separate. If to perceive is not to grasp essence, the subject must be a different category than the object, i.e., we must assume the objec tification of knowledge.
Both Plato and pre-Socratic philosophers are on a diffe rent episte mological plane than mythology. Ionian materialism, for example, is quite different than Platonic idealism. Thus, pre-Platonic thought cannot be reduced, as Ani does, to Homeric poetics. In the history of Weste rn phi losophy, the debate between rationalism and empiricism signals a deep epistemological divide about the role of the senses. The subordination of sensat ion to reason is not a singular feature of European thought as Ani claims. Hence, Plato's rationalism is not a singular European philo sophical tradition.
Both James and Olela show that the objectification of knowledge and the privileging of reason over sensation is something Plato adopted as a result of his training in Egypt. Plato's view of philosophy as a sci ence of knowledge ("episteme") is not original to him or the Greeks. 19 Hence Ani's assertion, "Plato's reason is the denial of spirit. Reason functions to control the more 'base appetites' and 'instincts.' The European view of the human begins to take shape here. " 20 Explorations in Ethnic Studies Vol. 18, No. 1 is a distortion of the history of philosophy and the notion of rationality held by the Egyptians.
Eurocentrism is a false universality; however, it is a non-sequitur to claim, as Ani does, that universality (in and of itself) is false. The episte mological and ontological points are corresponding philosophical issues. Ani's denial, on the epistemological plane, of objectivity (the objectifica tion of knowledge) is correlative to the negation of the ontological cat egory universality. And inversely, all claims that substantiate a realist epistemology, i.e., the objectification of knowledge, in turn give support to ontological claims of universality. Thus, the quest fo r particularity (by the Afrocentrist) not only entails the negation of universality, but also the negation of objectivity.
